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Explaining the performance  of Chinese equity funds 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of Chinese equity fund performance measured by market 
benchmark adjusted returns and risk adjusted return (Jensen’s Alpha). The sample covers 193 
equity funds from January 2006 to December 2011, including both bear (2008 and 2011) and bull 
(2006, 2007, 2009, and 2010) market conditions. We use fund characteristics including size, age, 
and expense ratio and managerial attributes including manager structure and management 
education to explain fund performance. We found only expense ratios significantly influence the 
fund performance under all market conditions. In addition the trading cost is positively associated 
with fund performance under the bear market. Fund age and management structure show varying 
impact across bull and bear market conditions. Management education is shown to be powerless 
in explaining fund performance in China.  
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1. Introduction 
With increasing household wealth and the development of its stock market in China, more and 
more capital have been invested in the Chinese stock market. Following the steps in the 
developed economies, mutual funds have become an attractive investment vehicle for both 
individual and institutional investors in China. A survey conducted by Galaxy Securities (France-
Presse, 2008) showed that 83% of the respondents (12,284 out of 14,800) preferred mutual funds 
as their first investment vehicle for financial asset management. Since the first mutual fund 
launched in 19983, the total amount have reached 1110 funds at the end of 2012 with a net asset 
value of 2.7 trillion Chinese Yuan (around 438 billion US$), of which 90% are open-end equity 
mutual funds.  
Mutual fund performance has been extensively examined in the developed markets, such as Elton, 
Gruber & Blake (1996), Carhart (1997), Otten & Bams (2002),  Huij & Verbeek (2007). Yet the 
extant literature is surprisingly scarce in evaluating and explaining the mutual fund performance 
in the emerging markets, especially in China. Babalos, Kostakis & Philippas (2009) study Greek 
funds, Białkowski and  Otten (2011) study Polish funds. Lai and Lau (2011) study Malaysian 
funds. Muga, Rodriguez & Santamaria (2007) study the mutual funds in Latin America. In 
addition to the missing literature in Chinese mutual funds, the rapid growth of the Chinese mutual 
fund market also warrants a systematic investigation of its fund performance.  
The focus of this paper is to explain the performance using fund characteristics and managerial 
attributes that are well documented in the developed markets. The Chinese financial market has 
its very distinct features. The market is filled with a large amount of retail investors who are 
considered as less financially sophisticated and tend to trade on the latest rumor. In contrast, 
mutual fund managers are well trained and could even have an information advantage. This leads 
to an expectation that Chinese mutual fund managers should achieve an outperformance. Deng & 
Xu (2011) use the holding data of institutional investors and they find stock selection ability of 
institutional investors in Chinese stocks. In explaining this outperformance, Tang, Wang & Xu 
(2012) focuses exclusively on the size factor, which has an inverted U-shape relationship with the 
3 The first open-end fund was launched in 2001. 
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performance. Our paper adds a few more fund characteristics and managerial attributes, and serve 
as a relatiely more complete start for future in-depth research into Chinese mutual funds.  
This paper measures fund performance by market benchmark adjusted returns and Jensen’s 
Alpha, and investigate the impact of fund characteristics and managerial attributes on 193 
Chinese open-end equity funds from January 2006 to December 2011. The explanatory variables 
examined include fund size, fund age, expense ratio, management structure and managerial 
education. We further examine the determinants under bear and bull market conditions.  In a 
nutshell, outperformance is detected, expense erodes fund performance across all market 
conditions except that trading cost is positively associated with fund performance under the bear 
market. Fund age and management structure play a role but their impacts differ across market 
conditions. Managerial education does not explain performance in the Chinese context. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will review the literature on the fund 
characteristics and managerial attributes in explaining the fund performance. Section 3 describes 
our sample selection and introduces the data. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Fund performance and its determinants 
We explain fund performance using fund-specific characteristics including expense ratio, size, 
and fund age and magerial attributes including manager education and management structure. 
Expense ratio is documented to be negatively related to fund performance in both developed 
(Carhart,1997, Prather, Bertin, & Henker, 2004)) and emerging economies (Gottesman and 
Morey, 2007, Babalos, Kostakis & Philippas, 2009). Rationale given by Berk & Green (2004) is 
that good performance attracts more cash inflows to the fund and the resulting enlarged asset base 
brings down the expense ratio. Behavior finance offers an alternative explanation for this 
negative relationship. Javier & Pablo (2008) argued that unsophisticated investors do not make 
optimal use of all available information when making their investment decisions. More 
specifically, unsophisticaled investors accept the information on fees in the format that is given 
by fund firms rather than the cognitive effort to understand it. The worse-performing funds 
charge fees equal or even higher than those set by better-performing funds.  
4 
 
Fund size can bring benefits such as more resources for research and economy of scale in 
lowering operating expenses (Dellva & Olson, 1998), but can also erode fund performance due to 
the high trading cost associated with liqudity and organizational diseconomy (Chen, Hong & 
Kubik, 2004).  Białkowski & Otten (2011) studied the Polish funds and  reported a postive size 
impact on performance. They observed that the Polish funds were still growing and their size was 
far from reaching the point to harm performance. The study of the Greek funds by Babalos, 
Kostakis, & Philippas (2009) reported a negative impact of size. The diseconomy of size wass 
caused by the fact that the Greek stock market was relatively illiquid with thin trading and few 
market players. Regarding the Chinese mutual funds, Tang, Wang & Xu (2012) found an inverted 
U-shape curve for the size effect for the period between 2004 and 2010, which implies the 
coexisting effect of the economy of scale and diseconomy of liquidity at different size points. 
Fund age indicates the experiences and social networks provided by a fund, and it is expected that 
mature funds outperform young funds. However, a counter argument can be that a new fund is 
more flexible and committed to achieve better performance. No significant relation is detected in 
the US market, but newer funds perform well outside the US (Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel & 
Ramos, 2013). In addition, Babalos, Kostakis & Philippas (2009) found a positve relation 
between age and performance for the Greek mutual funds.  
In addtion to the above characteristics we also add two magerial attributes which are documented 
to be relevant in the developed economies but not studied in the emerging economies. They are 
management structure and manager education. 
Management structure can be set as a single-manager or team-manager. Team management can 
bring a variant style and fair judgment, and even enlarge their professional skills and knowledge 
to deal with a broader range of information. Team management, however, can prolong the 
decision making process since it takes a longer time to reach an agreement within a team than 
with single management. Prather & Middleton (2006) and Bliss, Potter & Schwarz (2008) 
detected no difference made by the management structure, yet Karagiannidis (2010) documented 
a worse performance of team-manager funds than single-manager funds in the U.S.  In addition, 
Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel & Ramos (2013) documented the poor performance of team-manager 
fund both in the U.S. and outside the U.S. 
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Fund managers with a high level of education have better professional skills, knowledge and 
abilities, and psychological quality to make an efficient and effective decision. Golec (1996) 
documented that younger managers (less than 46 years old) with longer tenure (more than 7 years) 
who hold MBA degrees earned better risk-adjusted returns during 1988 to 1990 in the U.S. 
market. Furthermore, Gottesman & Morey (2006) examined the relationship for the 2000 to 2003 
period, and showed that fund managers holding a diploma from top 30 MBA programs (ranked 
by Business Week) achieved better performance than fund managers without a degree from the 
top 30 MBA programs.   
3. Data  
In the Chinese mutual funds market, there are five major types including equity funds, fixed 
income funds, money market funds, hybrid funds and Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor 
(QDII) funds. The first four types of funds can only invest in the Chinese financial market, and 
only QDII funds are allowed to invest in foreign securities markets due to the government’s 
control of capital flow. Equity funds have to invest more than 60% of its assets in equity, and 
fixed income funds have to invest more than 80% in bonds. 
Based on the available statistics from China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)  equity 
funds have grown from 42% of the whole fund industry in 2008 to 50% in 2012 in terms of both 
fund numbers and total assets under management. Therefore, to explain the fund performance, we 
focus on actively managed Chinese open-end equity funds.  
We obtained monthly information on Chinese open-end equity mutual funds mostly from 
CSMAR Mutual Fund4 provided by Guo’Tai’Jun’An (GTA) database for the period between 
January 2006 and December 2011. Managerial attributes are hand collected from the official 
website of each individual fund. 
We filter the data by the following process, 
• 447 open-end equity mutual funds in Chinese market until the end of 2011;  
• 396 funds left, after excluding funds (QDII) which invest in foreign stocks; 
• 272 funds left, after excluding passively-managed funds ( Exchange-Traded Funds); 
4 CSMAR stands for China Securities Market & Accounting Research, its website is 
http://csmar.gtadata.com/p/user/home.aspx   
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• Funds are excluded from the sample if the duration is less than two years of continuous 
operation because we need at least one-year data to estimate CAPM beta, and then 
another year to calculate alpha.  
• Funds missing important information like monthly returns are also removed from the 
sample.  
In the end, our sample is left with 193 equity mutual funds, with 649 fund-year observations. 
Equity funds invest in stocks listed in the two stock exchanges in China, respectively Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Raw returns reflect a fund’s performance for a 
one-year holding period including dividends. They are computed by compounding 12 monthly 
returns. Table 1 reports the basic information of our sample in each year during the sample period. 
Table 1 Sample distribution of Chinese actively managed open-end equity funds 
This table presents our sample of actively managed Chinese open-end equity funds during the period Jan. 2006 till Dec.2011. EW 
returns are the annual return for all funds in the sample equally weighted. VW returns are the annual return for all funds weighted 
by their market capitalization. 
 
The total assets of equity fund show a very large fluctuation over the years, dramatically rising 
from 1.8 billion Chinese Yuan (about US$ 291.7 million5) in 2006 to 12.5 billion (about US$ 2 
billion)in 2007, and then falling sharply to 5.4 billion (about US$ 875.2 million). The raw returns 
also show a dramatic change over time. Year 2008 and 2011 are considered as the bear market in 
our study due to the depressed asset value and market returns. 
Fund size is measured by the total assets. Fund age is the number of years since its establishment. 
Expense ratio is calculated total fund expenses as a percentage of average fund net assets. The 
5 Assuming the exchange rate is 1US$= 6.17 Chinese Yuan.  
Year No. funds Av. Fund size 
(total assets) 
Mil. Yuan 
Number of 
investment 
companies 
EW returns VW returns 
2006 31 1755.94 57 118.88% 85.87% 
2007 52 12538.01 58 120.40% 96.70% 
2008 92 5367.81 60 -50.23% -53.43% 
2009 124 8402.48 60 65.80% 75.01% 
2010 157 6081.13 62 5.21% -2.05% 
2011 193 3760.06 69 -15.21% -21.63% 
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total fund expenses in the database include 7 types of costs such as management fee, custody fee, 
service fee, execution fee and other fees. Execution fee measures the transaction costs associated 
with trading shares, which can indicate the frequency of trading activities. Thus we further divide 
the total expenses into operating expenses and trading costs.  
Management structure data is measured by the number of managers under a fund. Management 
structure is a team-manager if two or more managers are found to operate more than half of a 
year in a one year period. We create a dummy variable that equals 0 for single-manager funds 
and 1 for team-manager funds. Managerial education is indicated by the MBA degree of the fund 
manager. In a team-manager fund, if one of the managers holding an MBA degree serves more 
than half of a year during a one-year period, we assume that this fund has a manager holding an 
MBA degree, and this dummy variable equals 1. In China there are no short-term treasury bills, 
thus we use the one-year bank deposit rate as the risk free rate, which is regulated by the central 
bank. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for fund characteristics and managerial attributes. Panel 
A covers the whole sample of 649 fund-year observations. The average annual return ranges from 
negative 66% to positive 190% with the volatility as high as 59%, reflecting a volatile stock 
market in China. There is a large spread among the fund size. The average fund age is relatively 
young (4-year old). The mean annual expense ratio is 2.66%, which is between the emerging 
economies like Greece (4%) and the developed economies like the U.S. and U.K. (1.4%) 
(Babalos, Kostakis & Philippas, 2009, Khorana, Servaes & Tufano, 2008). The operating expense 
covers two thirds of the total expenses, and the trading cost cover the rest one thirds. A higher 
standard deviation of the trading costs (0.7%) reflects a larger variation in the trading costs across 
funds than the operating expenses (0.35%). For managerial attributes, the majority of funds (74%) 
are managed by a single manager, and 79% by managers without an MBA degree.  
Panels B and C present the descriptives under the bear- (2008 and 2011) and bull- (2006, 2007, 
2009 and 2010) market periods. As expected, the raw return, the total assets and the trading cost 
decline in the bear market. However, the operating expenses ratio does not vary much across the 
two market conditions. It reflects that management fee, a major component of operating expenses, 
is rather constant across all market conditions. 
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Table 2 Summary statistics of open-end equity mutual fund in China from 2006-2011 
This table presents the summary statistics for fund characteristics and managerial attributes for the whole sample 
period, bear- and bull- market periods, respectively. The sample includes all Chinese actively managed open-end 
equity mutual funds by excluding index-, QDII- funds from 2006 to 2011. The raw returns are annualized. The fund 
size is measured by total assets (TA). The fund age is the years of operation since its establishment.  The expense 
ratio is total expenses divided by the average net asset value. Operating expenses are total expenses subtracting 
trading costs. The management structure and managerial education are dummy variables, respectively taking 1 for 
team manager and 1 for possessing an MBA degree.  
 Mean Media Max Min S.D. 
Panel A: Whole sample    649 fund-year ob. (From 2006-2011) 
Raw return (p.a.) % 17.53 2.62 189.90 -66.42 54.07 
Fund size (TA) Mil. Yuan  6041 4038 41818 51 6149 
Fund age (years)  4.28 3.98 10.28 2.01 1.71 
Expense ratio (p.a.) % 2.60 2.42 9.04 .04 .90 
Operation expense R. (p.a.) % 1.76 1.76 4.04 .03 .35 
Trading cost R. (p.a.) % .85 .68 5.33 .00 .70 
Management structure .26 .00 1 0 .437 
Managerial education .21 .00 1 0 .41 
      
Panel B: Bear Market period  285 fund-year ob. (including 2008, 2011) 
Raw return (p.a.) % -26.50 -18.07 -2.24 -66.41 17.33 
Fund size (TA) Mil. Yuan 4272 3045 18609 51 3860 
Fund age (years) 4.51 4.42 10.28 2.04 1.88 
Expense ratio (p.a.) % 2.50 2.37 6.57 .41 .59 
Operation expense R. (p.a.) % 1.75 1.77 2.83 0.25 0.25 
Trading cost R. (p.a.) % .77 .64 4.31 .08 .54 
Management structure .27 0.00 1 0 .45 
Managerial education .20 0.00 1 0 .40 
      
Panel C: Bull Market period  364 fund-year ob. (including 2006, 2007, 2009,2010) 
Raw return (p.a.) % 52.00 54.02 189.90 -8.17 47.66 
Fund size (TA) Mil. Yuan 7426 5350 41818 67 7174 
Fund age (years) 4.10 3.75 9.28 2.01 1.55 
Expense ratio (p.a.) % 2.67 2.47 9.04 .04 1.08 
Operation expense R. (p.a.) % 1.76 1.74 4.04 .03 .40 
Trading cost R. (p.a.) % .91 .73 5.33 .00 .81 
Management structure .24 .00 1 0 .43 
Managerial education .22 .00 1 0 .41 
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix among independent variables. Large funds show a longer 
history and a lower expense ratio than small funds. Funds with team managers tend to possess an 
MBA degree. A strong correlation exists between operating expenses and trading costs, which 
indicates a potential multicollinearity problem in a regression with both variables.  
9 
 
Table 3 Correlation matrix of independent variables 
Pearson correlation coefficients for fund-specific characteristic and management attributes are analyzed from 2006 to 
2011. ** and *** indicated significance at the 5% and 1% level (2-tailed) respectively.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Ln(Fund age) 1 .085** -.016 -.106*** .066 -.048 
2 Ln(Total assets)  1 -.116*** -.259*** .068 -0.018 
3 Operation expense R.   1 .427*** -.022 -.003 
4 Trading cost R.    1 .005 .047 
5 Management Structure     1 .225*** 
6 Management education      1 
 
4. Methods and Empirical results 
a. Full sample analysis  
Fund performance is measured by abnormal fund returns calculated in two ways: market 
benchmark adjusted model and risk adjusted return using CAPM (Jensen’s alpha). As short 
selling is not allowed in China, so the Fama-French factors are not relevant in adjusting the risk6.  
Market benchmark adjusted return is computed as 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡 , where ARit is mutual fund 
i ’s market adjusted return in month t; Rmt is the market return, constructed as 40% *Shanghai 
composite index+ 20%* Shanghai Government Bond index + 40% Shenzhen component index) 7.  
Jensen’s alpha is measured by 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚�𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡� + ℰ𝑡, where Rft is the risk free 
rate (the one-year bank deposit rate); 𝛼𝑖 is Jensen’s alpha, the performance measure;  βmis beta as 
6 We also run our analysis using Fama-French model (Fama & French, 1993), yet the results are in general not 
significant. 
7Equity mutual funds are required to hold at least 20% of their asset in government bonds. Thus, we construct our 
market return from a portfolio that holds 40% Shanghai composite index, 40% Shenzhen component index and 20% 
Shanghai Government Bond index. However, this regulation was revoked in June 2006. Yet till now, a majority of 
equity mutual funds invest a considerate percentage of their total assets on bonds. In our robustness check we 
reconstruct the market return with 45% Shanghai composite index, 45% Shenzhen component index and 10% 
Shanghai Government Bond index. We re-estimate market benchmark adjusted returns and Jensen’s Alpha, and 
redo the analysis. Our results do not change much. 
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systematic risk of the fund. We adopt the estimation method by Huij & Verbeek (2007) to obtain 
abonormal returns. At the beginning of every year,  betas are estimated using pervious at least 12- 
to at the most 36- monthly return data. Then the estimated beta will be kept constant for the 
following one year, and used to calculate the monthly excess return for the subsequent 12 months, 
which are then compounded to get the annual abnormal returns. 
Table 4 reports the abnormal returns measured in two ways. Both measurements show that the 
Chinese equity funds outperform the market. Such outperformance is both statistical and 
economial significant. The abnormal return is between 4% to 5% per annum during our sample 
period. Though the market shows poor perofrmance in the bear market, the fund industry can still 
earn positive abnornal returns. In general, Chinese equity funds take less risk than the overal 
market. 
Table 4  Fund performance 
This table shows two measures of the fund performance over the whole sample period and separately under bear and 
bull market. *, ** and *** indicated significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The null hypothesis for 
the T-test for CAPM beta is beta=1.   
 Mean Median Max. Min. S.D. T-test 
Panel A: whole sample    649 fund-year ob. (From 2006-2011)  
Market benchmark adjusted (p.a.) % 5.06 5.23 56.91 -26.26 10.47 12.31*** 
Jensen’s alpha (p.a.) % 4.45 3.33 102.46 -28.32 13.92   8.14*** 
CAPM beta .896 .919 1.363 .134 .164 -16.04*** 
       
Panel B: Bear Market period  285 fund-year ob. (including 2008, 2011)  
Market benchmark adjusted (p.a.) % 6.73 7.30 49.40 -26.26 8.76 12.96*** 
Jensen’s alpha (p.a.) % 1.61 2.11 41.03 -25.86 9.03   3.00*** 
CAPM beta .848 .874 1.363 .134 .173 -14.88*** 
       
Panel C: Bull Market period  364 fund-year ob. (including 2006, 2007, 2009,2010)  
Market benchmark adjusted (p.a.) % 3.75 3.52 56.91 -24.95 11.48 6.24*** 
Jensen’s alpha (p.a.) % 6.68 3.89 102.46 -28.32 16.45 7.74*** 
CAPM beta .935 .956 1.330 .460 .146 -8.49*** 
Table 5 reports the regression results on fund characteristics and management attributes. The 
expense ratio is the only variable that is statistically significant. An increase of 100 basis points in 
expense ratio will decrease market benchmark adjusted return (or Jensen’s alpha) by 170 basis 
points (or 259). This result corroborates with the majority of the literature. A higher expenses 
automativally leads to a lower net return. Or as suggested by behavioural finance, the investors’ 
ignorance of expense charges allows worse-performing funds to charge fees equal or even higher 
than those set by better-performing funds.  
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Table 5 Regression on fund characteristics and management attributes 
This table shows the pooled OLS regression results on fund characteristics and management attributes. Dependent 
variable is fund performance measured respectively by market benchmark adjusted return, and Jensen’s alpha. 
LOGTA is the logarithm of total assets a year ago. The rest independent variables are measured contemporaneously  
with the dependent variable. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, ** and *** indicated significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable 
Market benchmark 
adjusted return 
Risk-adjusted return 
Jensen’s alpha 
LOGTA -1.138 
(-1.468) 
-1.464 
(-1.426) 
LOGAGE -1.813 
(-.740) 
-3.373 
(-1.040) 
EXPENSE R. -1.713 
(-3.656)*** 
-2.587 
(-4.173)*** 
MANAGEMENT 
STURCURE 
-1.035 
(-1.073) 
-1.831 
(-1.435) 
MANAGER EDUCATION -.298 
(-.290) 
-.822 
(-.604) 
Adjusted R2 .017 .026 
No. of observations 649 649 
 
The previously reported facors such as size8, age and managerial variables are shown to be 
statistically insignificant in explaining the overal fund performance in the sample period. The 
result on  managerial education confirms the findings in Chevalier & Ellison (1999). Positive 
results found in Golec (1996) are already two decades ago. The MBA degree is no longer that 
important in indicating the expertise of the fund managers in the current time, especially in China 
where its MBA programs are not as prestigious as those in the US. Gottesman & Morey (2006) 
also claimed that only managers with MBAs degrees from the top 30 MBA programs can achieve 
better fund performance. Another reason can be that in a growing industry such as Chinese fund 
indursty, a street knowledge or a social network can be more effective than the book knowledge 
obtained by the MBA studies.     
8 In an unreported table, we also add a squared term for size, the result still shows an insignificant relationship for 
both size and its squared term. 
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b. Subsample analysis under bull and bear market conditions 
The descriptives show a volatile stock market in China, and managers’ behavior may change. 
Thus we divide our sample into two subsamples: the bear market period of 2008 and 2011, the 
bull market period of 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2010. The resukts are shwon in Table 6. 
Table 6 Regression results under different market conditions 
This table shows the pooled OLS regression results on fund characteristics and management attributes for the bear 
and bull markets respectively. Dependent variable is fund performance measured respectively by market benchmark 
adjusted return, and Jensen’s alpha. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, ** and *** indicated significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable 
Market benchmark 
adjusted return 
Risk-adjusted return 
Jensen’s alpha 
Panel A: Bear market (including 2008, 2011) 
LOGTA .089 
(.081) 
2.665 
(2.421)** 
LOGAGE 12.866 
(4.458)*** 
14.122 
(4.835)*** 
EXPENSE R. 1.797 
(1.846)* 
1.632 
(1.657)* 
MANAGEMENT 
STURCURE 
1.086 
(.932) 
1.068 
(.906) 
MANAGER EDUCATION 1.224 
(.958) 
1.262 
(.975) 
Adjusted R2 .066 .100 
No. of observations 285 285 
     
Panel B: Bull market period (including 2006, 2007, 2009,2010) 
LOGTA -.491 
(-.450) 
-6.267 
(-4.059)*** 
LOGAGE -17.349 
(-4.753)*** 
-18.277 
(-3.539)*** 
EXPENSE R. -2.102 
(-3.885)*** 
-3.903 
(-5.098)*** 
MANAGEMENT 
STURCURE 
-3.871 
(-2.809)*** 
-4.485 
(-2.300)** 
MANAGER EDUCATION -.795 
(-.556) 
-2.023 
(-1.000) 
Adjusted R2 .103 .127 
No. of observations 364 364 
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A notable change is the fund age. Fund age shows a postive impact on fund performance only 
during the bear market and its impact reverses to negative in the bull market. This implies that 
long established funds are better in sitting out the hard times, by for example, taking a 
conservative investment approach. Accordingly, their performance suffers in the bull market. The 
impact of fund size becomes similar to that of the fund age when fund perforamnce is meaured by 
Jensen’s alpha. Large firms perform poorly in the bull market but well in the bear market. The 
reason might share some similariy with the fund age impact. This conjecture for size and age  
effect needs more future research to prove.  
Team managers also exhibit different impact under bear and bull markets. Team managers show 
significantly negative impact in the bull market, but postive impact in the bear market though not 
statistically significant. This suggests that poor market conditions tends to pull together the team 
managers towards one goal, while a buoyant market tends to push individual managers to pursue 
their strategies in their own benefits. In China, a team-manager fund mostly includes only two 
managers: an experienced one and an green hand. But the experienced manager hardly manages 
the fund and delegates the task to the inexperienced one. Often the purpose to have this senior 
manager’s name on the fund fact sheet is to market the fund better. If this is true, then it can be 
reasoned that funds are actually managed by the inexperienced manager during the good times, 
and taken over by the experienced one during the bad times.  
The impact of expense ratio differs in two market conditions. Descriptives show that the variation 
in trading costs across funds is much higher than the variation in operating expenses. To 
elaborate on the change of expense ratio impact we re-run the regression by replacing the total 
expense ratio with the operating expense ratio and the trading cost ratio, as shown in Table 7.  
The overal impact of operating expense remains the same across all market conditions that it 
erodes fund perofrmance. The trading cost, however, shows a positive impact on Jensen’s alpha 
in a statistically significant way. A higher trading cost is linked to more frequent trading. In the 
bear market even though the overall trading activities decline, funds who trade more show a 
higher performance than funds who trade less. Studies such as Wermers (2000), Moskowitz 
(2000), Kacperczyk, Sialm & Zheng (2005), and Tang, Wang & Xu (2012), have shown a 
positive relation between trading activities and fund perfomance. A frequently trading manager is 
likely to make more success relative to infrequently trading managers. The reason they trade is 
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that they can profit from trading on new information. The frequent trade, however, incurs taxes 
and transaction costs, and therefore reduces the return, as documented in Carhart (1997), Edelen , 
Evans & Kadlec (2007), Haslem, Baker & Smith (2008). Our result on trading costs shows that in 
the depressed market condition, managers are more prudent in trading, and tradings are made 
only when the benefits exceed the costs. 
Table 7 Regression under different market conditions using operating expenses and trading costs 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable 
Market benchmark 
adjusted return 
Risk adjusted return 
Jensen’s alpha 
Panel A: Bear market (including 2008, 2011) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
LOGTA -.687 
(-.685) 
-.199 
(-.187) 
-.085 
(-.078) 
1.697 
(1.674)* 
2.727 
(2.544)** 
2.573 
(2.350)** 
LOGAGE 12.074 
(4.177)*** 
12.839 
(4.420)*** 
12.707 
(4.353)*** 
13.689 
(4.687)*** 
14.432 
(4.934)*** 
14.610 
(4.972)*** 
OPER. EXPENSE R. 1.125 
(.546) 
 
 
1.083 
(.527) 
-1.402 
(-.673) 
 -1.463 
(-.706) 
TRADING COST R.  1.505 
(1.431) 
1.497 
(1.421) 
 2.166 
(2.044)** 
2.176 
(2.052)** 
MANAGEMENT 
STURCURE 
1.359 
(1.162) 
1.116 
(.954) 
1.167 
(1.421) 
1.204 
(1.019) 
.994 
(.843) 
.925 
(.781) 
MANAGER EDUCATION 1.222 
(.951) 
1.258 
(.981) 
1.276 
(.994) 
1.218 
(.938) 
1.321 
(1.024) 
1.296 
(1.003) 
Adjusted R2 .055 .061 .059 .092 .104 .103 
No. of observations 285 285 285 285 285 285 
       
Panel B: Bull market period (including 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
LOGTA -.046 
(-.043) 
-.355 
(-.320) 
-.143 
(-.131) 
-5.217 
(-3.399)*** 
-6.348 
(-4.063)*** 
-6.181 
(-3.969)*** 
LOGAGE -17.531 
(-4.847)*** 
-17.120 
(-4.646)*** 
-17.542 
(-4.844)*** 
-18.217 
(-3.488)*** 
-17.993 
(-3.465)*** 
-18.325 
(-3.543)*** 
OPER EXPENSE R. -6.624 
(-4.701)*** 
 
 
-6.259 
(-3.739)*** 
-8.573 
(-4.214)*** 
 -4.926 
(-2.060)** 
TRADING COST R.  
 
-2.074 
(-2.819)*** 
-.348 
(-.405) 
 -4.830 
(-4.658)*** 
-3.472 
(-2.834)*** 
MANAGEMENT 
STURCURE 
-3.735 
(-2.735)*** 
-3.913 
(-2.811)*** 
-3.750 
(-2.741)*** 
-4.307 
(-2.184)** 
-4.583 
(-2.336)** 
-4.455 
(-2.280)** 
MANAGER EDUCATION -1.004 
(-.710) 
-.815 
(-.564) 
-.966 
(-.681) 
-2.442 
(-1.196) 
-1.947 
(-.956) 
-2.065 
(-1.019) 
Adjusted R2 .120 .086 .118 .107 .117 .125 
No. of observations 364 364 364 364 364 364 
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5. Conclusion  
The growing Chinese mutual fund industry has been considerably under researched. This paper   
tries to narrow this gap by investigating the determinants of Chinese fund performance. More 
specifically we analyze 193 actively-managed open-end equity mutual funds by examining the 
impact of fund-specific characteristics and management attributes on fund performance from 
January 2006 to December 2011. Through two measures of fund performance, the market 
benchmark adjusted return and Jensen’s alpha, we find Chinese equity funds outperform the 
market, both under bear and bull markets. Expense ratio erodes fund performance, and manager 
education measured by MBA degrees is not useful in explaining fund performance in China. 
Other characteristics show interestingly different impact under different market conditions. Fund 
age and fund size postively influences fund performance only during the bear market and their 
impact reverses to negative in the bull market. We speculate this could be attributed to different 
investment philosophy of young and established funds. Team managers work better in the bear 
market, but not so in the bull market. We suggest investigating the management practice in team-
manager funds under different market conditions can be a promising direction for future research. 
We extract trading costs from the total expenses and find they boost performance under the bear 
market. This suggests that in the depressed market managers are engaged in more prudent  
actions and trade on when it is profitable. All in all, our results on fund size, age, management 
structure and trading cost open up a wide range of interesting research in future. 
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